

POLICY REPORT #2

Indigenous-Led Arctic Sovereignty, Climate Security, and Strategic Policy Pathways in a Shifting U.S.-Canada Landscape (ICASUS)

An ICASUS Policy Analysis, Research, and Interactive Seminar (PARIS) Initiative
Conflict and Resilience Research Institute Canada (CRRIC)

Workshop #2, 19-20 June 2026, Ottawa, Canada

Executive Summary

This policy report contains the findings of the second ICASUS workshop, held in Ottawa on 19-20 June 2026 as part of CRRIC's Policy Analysis, Research, and Interactive Seminar model. Workshop 2 was designed as a two-day policy process. Day 1 brought together presentations and panel discussions on Indigenous-led sovereignty, Arctic security, climate change, foreign interference, infrastructure, permafrost, Canada-U.S. relations, China's interests in the Arctic, Norway's High North experience, and the future of Arctic governance. Day 2 convened a smaller closed policy dialogue guided by leading questions on shared decision-making, Indigenous authority, community wellbeing, defence cooperation, non-Arctic actors, and climate adaptation.

The report builds from, but does not duplicate, ICASUS Policy Report #1. The March workshop established that Canada's Arctic cannot be secured by military hardware alone; that sovereignty is lived capacity; that Indigenous knowledge is operational knowledge; that climate change is a total systems condition; and that consultation must move toward co-design. The Ottawa workshop sharpened those findings into policy tasks. Its central contribution is the need to map sovereignty itself: different actors use the word sovereignty to refer to legal recognition, territorial control, community authority, movement, stewardship, consent, food systems, sustainable housing, environmental responsibility, and intergenerational continuity. Without mapping those meanings, policy risks building consensus around a word while masking disagreement about power.

The report's core finding is that Canada is at a strategic crossroads. A new wave of defence, infrastructure, critical mineral, energy, port, and transportation investment is being justified through security, sovereignty, and national interest. Some of this investment is necessary. Canada has real defence gaps, infrastructure deficits, and foreign interference vulnerabilities. Yet, if these initiatives proceed through compressed timelines, thin consultation, emergency language, southern procurement, and external contractors, they will reproduce the very insecurity they claim to solve. Arctic sovereignty will be strengthened only if investment builds northern capacity, Indigenous authority, environmental resilience, youth leadership, and durable trust.

The Ottawa discussions also produced a caution against conceptual inflation. Several participants argued that housing, the opioid crisis, food insecurity, healthcare, education, energy, and language continuity are central to northern security. Others warned that if Arctic security dominates discourse, the concept loses precision and defence vulnerabilities may be neglected. This report therefore proposes a layered security framework: Indigenous self-determination, defence, public safety, human security, ecological security, and infrastructure security, should be distinguished analytically but governed relationally.

The recommendations focus on practical implementation: create a sovereignty mapping project; establish front-end co-design and shared decision-making protocols; require Arctic investment to pass a local benefit and legacy infrastructure test; integrate climate adaptation into every defence and infrastructure decision; develop guardrails for foreign engagement, including China, without resorting to panic; build a funded Arctic youth and land-based resilience pathway; strengthen Indigenous and northern institutional partnerships; and ensure that future ICASUS work is co-led with northern Indigenous partners and carried out in the North wherever possible.

Key Findings

1. The Ottawa workshop confirms that sovereignty must be mapped as a multidimensional concept rather than assumed as a settled state-centric term.
2. Indigenous governments must be treated as governing partners with authority, not as stakeholders consulted after decisions are substantially designed.
3. Human security, ecological security, and Indigenous self-determination are not substitutes for defence; they are conditions that determine whether defence and sovereignty are legitimate and sustainable.

4. Canada's response to U.S. pressure must not compress legally required consultation, climate adaptation, or Indigenous rights into a reactive defence-spending exercise.
5. China and other non-Arctic actors require guardrails, knowledge, and coordinated capacity, not panic-based policy or naive openness.
6. The climate crisis is changing Arctic access in uneven and unpredictable ways; it creates operational instability, infrastructure risk, and community vulnerability.
7. Infrastructure must be evaluated by legacy, life-cycle obligations, local benefit, and community authority, not only by construction announcements.
8. Youth, Guardians programs, Rangers, land-based learning, and northern exchanges should be funded as sovereignty infrastructure.
9. Future ICASUS work should move northward and be co-led with Indigenous or northern institutions.
10. Long-horizon Arctic policy requires a values and seven-generations screen to test whether projects strengthen the North beyond short-term security rhetoric.

1. Background: ICASUS, PARIS, and Workshop #2

Indigenous-Led Arctic Sovereignty and Climate Security in a Shifting U.S.-Canada Strategic Landscape (ICASUS) was developed to examine how Arctic sovereignty and climate security should be understood in a period of accelerated geopolitical change. The project is funded by the Mobilizing Insights in Defence and Security program of the Department of National Defence and organized by the Conflict and Resilience Research Institute Canada (CRRIC).

CRRIC's PARIS model, meaning Policy Analysis, Research, and Interactive Seminar, is central to the project. PARIS is not a conventional conference format. It is a structured policy-development process that moves from expert input to interactive testing to policy synthesis. In the ICASUS context, this model has allowed defence scholars, Indigenous leaders, climate scientists, public officials, civil society actors, students, and community advocates to occupy the same policy space without reducing the conversation to any single discipline.

Workshop #1, held in Winnipeg on 31 March-1 April 2026, established the baseline argument. It found that Arctic sovereignty cannot be secured by hardware alone; that climate change affects food, travel, infrastructure, wildlife, emergency management, health, and defence; that Indigenous knowledge must be treated as operational knowledge; that infrastructure is the material foundation of sovereignty; that consultation must move toward co-design; and that the strongest emerging model of Arctic governance is relational and co-productive.

Workshop #2 was designed as a second-stage PARIS exercise. The first day at the Canadian War Museum in Ottawa involved keynote-style presentations, expert panels, and discussion. The second day was a closed policy dialogue that began from prepared leading questions from the first day of the workshop. These questions explicitly asked how Canada can move from consultation to shared decision-making authority; how sovereignty would look if defined through Inuit, First Nations, Metis, and northern priorities; how community wellbeing should be treated alongside military readiness; how Canada should handle U.S. defence cooperation and China; and how climate adaptation should be integrated into defence, infrastructure, housing, healthcare, emergency planning, and resource development.

The Ottawa workshop therefore, performed a different function from the Winnipeg workshop. Winnipeg opened the conceptual space; Ottawa tested the possibility and scopes of implementation. Winnipeg established that the dominant state-centred frame is inadequate; Ottawa asked what institutional alternatives should follow. Winnipeg argued that sovereignty is lived capacity; Ottawa asked how sovereignty itself should be mapped across communities, legal systems, governance traditions, and policy fields.

2. Methodology and Source Note

This report uses the June 19 and June 20 workshop transcripts as primary source material. The June 19 transcript includes presentations and panel discussions, although some sections are identified as missing or incomplete, including parts of the presentations of Marisol Maddox and Dr. Purnama. Question and Answer sessions captured the essence of the missing parts of the presentations – the report uses only the captured material. The June 20 transcript is a cleaned working transcript prepared from phone-generated audio; speaker labels are preserved but not all identities are verified. The report therefore uses attribution carefully, relying on clear speaker labels where available and using non-attributed phrasing where the transcript is unclear.

The report also uses the Workshop #2 opening remarks, the June 20 leading questions, policy meeting notes, ICASUS Policy Report #1, and the earlier consolidated thematic memo. These materials are treated as part of the project record. The purpose is not to produce a journal-style transcript analysis, but to generate a policy report that reflects the seminar evidence, identifies actionable themes, and supports CRRIC's submission to funders and policy audiences.

Verbatim quotations are included selectively. They are used where the wording is clear, thematically important, and policy-relevant. Because some portions of the transcript are inaudible, the report avoids using unclear statements as direct evidence. In some cases, quotes are lightly contextualized but not substantively altered. Any phrase drawn from a clearly identified presentation or dialogue turn is cited in the text by speaker, date, and session type.

3. Conceptual Framework: What Are We Talking About When We Talk About Sovereignty?

The Ottawa workshop was organized around a deceptively simple question: what are we talking about when we talk about sovereignty? The opening remarks introduced Stephen Krasner's four-fold distinction among international legal sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty, domestic sovereignty, and interdependence sovereignty. This was useful because Canada's formal legal sovereignty over much of its Arctic is not the same as effective governing capacity across the North. A map line, as the opening remarks put it, is not the same as the power to act.

This framework helped clarify the state's problem, but the workshop's discussion moved beyond it. Indigenous and northern perspectives do not necessarily begin with recognition by states or exclusion of their authority. They often begin with responsibilities to land, water, animals, ancestors, youth, mobility, language, food, and future generations. They ask whether communities can govern themselves, maintain their ways of life, say yes or no to projects, and shape the conditions under which outside institutions enter their territory.

The Yukon Grand Chief Math'ieya Alatini's presentation made this distinction explicit. Yukon First Nations, she emphasized, are not merely stakeholders but governments with modern treaty relationships and governance authority. Arctic sovereignty from that perspective is not simply defended space; it is inhabited, governed, cared for, and sustained land. Her statement that "You cannot separate national security from community well-being" became one of the strongest anchors for the Ottawa report.

Day 2 further sharpened the issue. Joan Kuyek stated that "sovereignty means the right to say no." Dr. Imtiaz Ahmed recommended that CRRIC map the meaning of sovereignty, state, culture, peace, war, threat, and colonialism across communities because these concepts may not mean what mainstream policy assumes they mean. Dr. Purnama supported this argument by noting that different societies and Indigenous communities organize identity, authority, and belonging through different conceptual systems.

The report therefore uses a layered sovereignty framework. International legal sovereignty concerns recognition by other states. Westphalian sovereignty concerns exclusion of outside authority. Domestic sovereignty concerns actual governing capacity. Interdependence sovereignty concerns control over movements of people, goods, data, finance, technologies, and threats. Indigenous lived sovereignty concerns self-determination, stewardship, consent, mobility, language, food systems, cultural continuity, and responsibility to future generations. Arctic policy fails when it collapses these layers into one state-centred definition.

4. Context: The New Arctic Investment Moment

The Ottawa workshop took place at a moment when Canada's Arctic policy is being reshaped by three pressures at once: climate change, geopolitical uncertainty, and major federal defence and infrastructure investment. These pressures overlap but are not identical. Climate change affects the physical ground on which communities and infrastructure depend. Geopolitical uncertainty affects alliance behaviour, foreign engagement, and threat perception. Federal investment affects who benefits, who decides, and what kind of legacy will remain in the North.

The opening remarks connected this moment to Canada's Defence Industrial Strategy, strategic autonomy, the Build-Partner-Buy approach, and the stated emphasis on working with domestic partners in the North and Arctic. That connection is important because it places ICASUS within an active policy window, not a purely academic discussion. Decisions about radar, ports, roads, airports, operational hubs, communications, energy, critical minerals, and procurement are either being made or being prepared.

The workshop participants accepted that Canada has real defence and infrastructure gaps. Although they did not argue for a passive Arctic, they did argue that speed cannot be allowed to erase rights, climate reality, community authority, or local benefit. The core policy question is not whether Canada should invest in the North, it is rather whether Canada will invest in a way that builds Indigenous-led sovereignty or in a way that repeats older patterns of extraction, militarization, and abandonment.

This new investment moment therefore requires an accountability test. Does the project strengthen Indigenous governments? Does it improve housing, energy, communications, emergency capacity, and local employment? Does it protect land and water? Does it include rigorous social, cultural, and environmental assessment? Does it leave behind usable community infrastructure? Does it reduce vulnerability to foreign interference? Does it build Canadian and northern capacity rather than flowing mainly to external contractors? If the answer is no, then the project may expand activity in the North without strengthening sovereignty, and therefore be harmful to Indigenous Peoples in the Arctic.

5. Thematic Findings from Workshop #2

a. Map sovereignty as a contested policy concept

Workshop #2's most distinctive policy recommendation is that sovereignty itself requires mapping. The concept is not set in stone. It changes across legal traditions, Indigenous governance systems, state practice, military doctrine, community priorities, and ecological relationships. Without mapping these meanings, Canada may continue to produce Arctic policy that appears inclusive based on their vocabulary choices, while remaining state-centred at the level of power.

The opening remarks used Krasner to distinguish legal recognition from governing capacity. That is an important starting point because Canada's challenge in the Arctic is not simply whether other states recognize its claims. It is whether Canada can monitor, provide, govern, respond, and sustain life across a vast northern geography. In this respect, domestic and interdependence sovereignty are more directly tested than international legal sovereignty.

However, the dialogue showed that Indigenous understandings may not map neatly onto Krasner's categories. Sovereignty may mean the ability to maintain reciprocal relationships with land and animals. It may mean the right to consent or to refuse. It may mean control over movement and mobility. It may mean language survival, food access, stewardship, spiritual responsibility, and the ability to pass knowledge to the younger generations. It may also vary among Inuit, First Nations, Metis, Yukon First Nations, Nunavut communities, Northwest Territories communities, and circumpolar Indigenous peoples beyond Canada.

A sovereignty mapping project would therefore be both conceptual and practical. It should ask communities how they define sovereignty, state, land, water, mobility, security, peace, war, threat, development, consultation, consent, and national interest. It should compare these definitions with federal, territorial, Department of Defence, Global Affairs, and academic uses. The goal should not be to force uniformity. It should be to produce a translation tool that prevents policy actors from talking past one another.

"Sovereignty means the right to say no." - Joan Kuyek, June 20 policy dialogue

"The concept of sovereignty is not something that is set in stone." - Dr. Kawser Ahmed, June 20 closing reflections

The policy implication is clear: Canada cannot claim to build Indigenous-led Arctic policy while leaving the core concept of sovereignty undefined by Indigenous peoples themselves. A sovereignty mapping initiative, co-led between CRRIC and with Indigenous and northern partners, would be a concrete next step from this workshop.

b. Treat Indigenous governments as governing partners, not stakeholders

A core distinction throughout Workshop #2 was the difference between stakeholder inclusion and government-to-government partnership. The Yukon Grand Chief Math'ieya Alatini stated that Yukon First Nations are not stakeholders; they are governments. This point has major implications for Arctic defence, infrastructure, climate adaptation, research, and resource development.

Stakeholder language tends to place Indigenous communities among many interested parties. It can flatten and devalue constitutional, treaty, and inherent rights as Indigenous Peoples into a consultation list. Government-to-government language recognizes that Indigenous nations have governance systems, legal relationships, and decision-making responsibilities that predate the creation of Canada and continue through modern treaties, self-government agreements, and land-based authority.

This distinction is particularly important for large security and infrastructure projects. If federal and territorial governments treat Indigenous nations as stakeholders after site selection, procurement design, environmental assumptions, and risk calculations have already been made, co-design has not occurred, and the repetition of colonial practices remains. If Indigenous governments are involved at the problem-definition stage, they can help determine what the project is, where it should be, what risks matter, what benefits are acceptable, and what should not proceed.

"Yukon First Nations are not stakeholders, we are governments." - Yukon Grand Chief Math'ieya Alatini, June 19 presentation

On Day 2, Natalija Vojno grounded the discussion within Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (ITK). ITK explicitly connects Arctic security with human security, arguing that the most immediate threats in the region stem from foreign influence and interference, economic destabilization, and persistent inequalities between Inuit Nunangat and the rest of Canada. It maintains that securing the Arctic requires sustained investment in Inuit well-being, including prosperity, health care, education, public services, food security, infrastructure, and strengthened Inuit–Crown partnerships, rather than relying primarily on military expansion.

ITK further stresses that Inuit use and occupancy of Inuit Nunangat are foundational to Canada's sovereignty claims over the Northwest Passage. This framing is significant for the broader analysis, as it situates sovereignty not solely in terms of territorial control and defence capacity, but also in Indigenous presence, governance, environmental monitoring, knowledge systems, and political legitimacy.

The policy implication is that Indigenous authority must be built into governance design rather than added as a consultation component. This requires formal mechanisms, resourcing, and time. It also means that major federal investments should not proceed as if Indigenous consent and local legitimacy are implementation details.

c. Move from consultation to co-decision and co-implementation

The June 20 leading questions asked how Canada can move from consultation to shared decision-making authority in Arctic governance, including Indigenous authority over defence, infrastructure, resource, and

climate adaptation projects. The closed discussion confirmed that this is the implementation question at the heart of ICASUS.

Participants repeatedly expressed concern that current consultation practices may be too late, too thin, too legalistic, or too dependent on emergency and national-interest language. If a defence or infrastructure project is already framed as necessary before affected communities are involved, consultation risks becoming a legitimizing ritual. It can inform mitigation, but it cannot shape the decision.

Darcia Senft's reference to the Stanford co-creation model offered one process vocabulary: dialogue, access, risk-reward transparency, and reflexivity. This aligns with the PARIS model, which treats policy as iterative and co-produced rather than delivered. A northern co-design process should not simply invite responses to a predetermined plan. It should create structured access to information, technical support for communities, transparent discussion of risks and benefits, and the ability to revise or reject assumptions.

The policy paper therefore recommends an Arctic Co-Decision Protocol for major federal projects. Such a protocol should include early notice, shared problem definition, Indigenous-government and leadership participation in site selection, independent technical support for Indigenous communities, gender and youth input, social and environmental assessment, benefit-sharing, procurement transparency, and a right to propose alternatives.

d. Build a layered model of security: defence, human security, ecological security, and Indigenous self-determination

Workshop #2 repeatedly challenged narrow military definitions of Arctic security. At the same time, it warned against conceptual dilution. This is one of the report's most important analytical balances.

The military and defence dimension is real. Canada has radar gaps, infrastructure deficits, limited permanent presence, surveillance challenges, NORAD modernization pressures, and exposure to hybrid threats. Dr. Piché highlighted the vulnerability of the Canadian Arctic to hybrid threats, including critical minerals, foreign influence, information operations, telecommunications, and dual-purpose research. Eric Bertram explained why China-related engagement requires knowledge, guardrails, coordination, and the need not to panic.

Yet participants also insisted that northern communities experience security through housing, food, health, education, water, energy, safe transportation, language, land access, and freedom from social harm. Ken Coates's intervention was blunt: the most immediate security issue in many Indigenous communities is not Russia or China, but opioids, predominantly fentanyl, and poverty. Others emphasized teacher turnover, housing shortages, healthcare gaps, food prices, and the absence of sustainable local employment.

The report therefore proposes a layered model. Hard defence addresses territorial defence, aerospace warning, maritime awareness, NORAD, and alliance obligations. Public safety addresses emergency response, search and rescue, policing, cyber threats, and foreign interference. Human security addresses housing, food, health, education, mental health, cultural, and social stability. Ecological security addresses climate change, permafrost, water, wildlife, contaminants, and landscape integrity. Indigenous self-determination addresses authority, consent, governance, treaty rights, language, land-based knowledge, and intergenerational responsibility.

"Human security is national security." - Natalija Vojno, June 20 closing discussion

This model preserves analytical discipline while recognizing interdependence. It prevents defence from absorbing everything, but it also prevents housing, food, climate, and cultural continuity from being treated as unrelated to sovereignty.

e. Understand the U.S. relationship as both indispensable and destabilizing

The Ottawa workshop took place in a moment of strain in the Canada-U.S. relationship. Presenters and participants referred to the U.S. pressure on defence spending, Greenland rhetoric, continental defence, NATO burden-sharing, trade tensions, and the broader disruption of the old-world order. The opening remarks framed the change as a rupture rather than a normal transition.

The discussion did not produce anti-American consensus. Several contributors noted the depth of Canada-U.S. integration in defence, trade, energy, families, border communities, and NORAD. The Q&A following Marisol Maddox's presentation emphasized that the U.S. does not need to acquire new Arctic territory to achieve a coordinated continental defence architecture. Cooperation can be efficient and respectful of sovereignty.

The concern was that Canada may be reacting too quickly to the U.S. pressure without sufficiently defining its own northern policy values. If defence spending becomes a rushed signal to Washington, Arctic infrastructure may be planned around external reassurance rather than Indigenous partnership, climate resilience, and Canadian strategic autonomy. Several participants warned that a reactive posture could repeat the historical pattern of wartime and Cold War infrastructure that left environmental damage, community disruption, and abandoned systems.

The policy implication is that Canada should cooperate with the United States where necessary, especially through NORAD and continental defence, while defining a distinctly Canadian Arctic security approach grounded in Indigenous authority, community empowerment, climate adaptation, and long-term national capacity.

f. Address China and foreign interference through capacity, guardrails, and realistic engagement

China appeared in the Ottawa workshop as both risk and opportunity. From Global Affairs Canada, Eric Bertram's presentation emphasized that China matters to the Arctic because Chinese entities are active, organized, well-resourced, and embedded in a party-state system where information, research, corporate activity, and state interests can be connected. His work with Arctic partners aims to build China knowledge where northern governments and Indigenous institutions may not have the resources to maintain their own China expertise.

Dr. Piché added the security dimension: hybrid threats combine overt and covert, military and non-military tools. Critical minerals, telecommunications, disinformation, research buoys, balloons, and infrastructure investment can create vulnerabilities. The issue is not only whether China is physically present. It is whether infrastructure gaps, data gaps, research dependency, and community need create openings for influence.

Day 2 reinforced the picture by asking whether China is being inflated as a threat while Canada's own treatment of Indigenous peoples remains a more immediate source of insecurity. Dr. Imtiaz Ahmed argued that although they are interested in the Arctic, China has a different world view and should not automatically be understood through Western colonial assumptions. Participants also acknowledged that if Canada fails to invest, others will offer their own resources.

The report therefore rejects both panic and naivete. Canada should engage China and other non-Arctic actors with eyes open. It should build federal, territorial, and Indigenous capacity to assess proposals, protect data, manage research partnerships, screen investment, prevent coercion, and identify acceptable areas of cooperation. Arctic partners should not be left alone to negotiate with powerful external actors.

"Our offer is: we can help be your China team." - Eric Bertram, June 19 presentation

China has expressed a sustained interest in expanding its presence in the Arctic through its 2018 Arctic Policy and the Polar Silk Road initiative, both of which promote Chinese participation in infrastructure development, shipping, energy cooperation, and resource extraction across the region. In Canada, this interest has been evident in Nunavut, including Shandong Gold's unsuccessful bid to acquire the Hope Bay gold project and the Chinese ambassador's 2024 visit to Iqaluit, where he reiterated China's interest in investment opportunities within Canada's mining sector. At the same time, Canadian policymakers increasingly view Chinese engagement in the Arctic through a national security perspective, particularly where investments in critical minerals, infrastructure, scientific research, and Indigenous governance have implications for Arctic sovereignty.

The policy implication is that Canada should fund an Arctic Foreign Engagement Support Mechanism for Indigenous and northern governments, with legal, cyber, data governance, investment screening, and China expertise available on request.

g. Reject the myth of one Arctic

One of the strongest expert findings from June 19 was that the Arctic must be understood as plural. Dr. Mathieu Landriault argued that one of the most persistent misperceptions is treating the Arctic as a single uniform region. The Russian Arctic, European Arctic, American Arctic, and Canadian Arctic are not experiencing climate, security, shipping, public opinion, resource development, or infrastructure dynamics in the same way.

Dr. Paal Sigurd Hilde's presentation on Norway reinforced this point through comparison. Northern Norway has towns, roads, universities, military history, population density, and climate conditions very different from northern Canada. Indigenous politics also differ: Sami people are significant but demographically and politically differently situated from Inuit and First Nations in northern Canada. Norway's High North strategies offer lessons, but not templates.

This matters because policy borrowing can fail. The Canadian Rangers model may interest Greenland, but the opening remarks noted that Greenland has no comparable military service tradition and that the Canadian Rangers themselves are limited in training and resourcing. Similarly, Norway's High North policy cannot be imported into Nunavut, Yukon, Northwest Territories, Nunavik, Inuvialuit, and Nunatsiavut without adaptation.

The policy implication is that every Arctic project should be place-based. Defence, infrastructure, housing, energy, and climate adaptation should be planned through sub-regional analysis and community-specific governance arrangements rather than through a single northern blueprint.

h. Treat climate adaptation as defence readiness and community survival

Climate change was not discussed as a background environmental factor. It was treated as an operational condition that changes what is possible. Permafrost thaw affects roads, runways, housing, pipelines, waste containment, and the cost of maintenance. Sea ice change affects travel, shipping, hunting, safety, and surveillance. Wildfires and low water levels affect evacuations and community resupply. Ecosystem shifts affect the abundance of country food, traditional medicinal plants, animals, and cultural continuity.

Dr. Fabrice Calmels' permafrost discussion linked infrastructure, food security, land use, cultural sites, and ecosystem change. The important point is that infrastructure designed for yesterday's ground conditions may fail under today's warming conditions. Imported food can be affected if airports or roads fail. Country food can be affected if lakes drain, breeding/calving grounds are disturbed, or landscapes transform. Cultural continuity can be affected when ancestral sites erode or collapse.

Dr. Piché and Andrew Smith both challenged the idea that melting ice automatically means easier access. A warmer Arctic may produce longer shipping windows in some areas while simultaneously increasing

unpredictability in navigation, weather, ice movement, shallow water risks, and terrestrial access. The result is not simple openness, but complex volatility.

The policy implication is that defence investments should include climate risk modelling, permafrost-sensitive design, Indigenous land knowledge, life-cycle adaptation budgets, and emergency redundancy. Climate adaptation is not an environmental add-on to sovereignty. It is one of sovereignty's operating conditions.

i. Build northern benefit and legacy obligations into all infrastructure spending

Large-scale Arctic infrastructure spending is now being discussed through defence, sovereignty, security corridors, ports, roads, airports, radar, and support hubs. Workshop #2 asked whether such spending will build northern capacity or primarily enrich southern and external contractors.

Participants repeatedly warned about legacy. The Alaska Highway, DEW Line, abandoned World War II military infrastructure, contaminated mining sites, and Cold War-era installations offer historical lessons. Infrastructure can remain long after the security justification has faded. If poorly planned, it can leave toxins, ecological disruption, social and cultural impacts, and maintenance burdens. If planned with community authority, it can leave housing, communications, energy systems, training, jobs, emergency capacity, and multi-use facilities.

The policy implication is that every major Arctic infrastructure project should include a Northern Legacy Plan. This plan should specify local employment, Indigenous procurement, skills development, community reuse, environmental monitoring, cleanup responsibilities, take-back and leave-no-trace obligations, data governance, and long-term maintenance funding. Dual-use infrastructure should be defined carefully, including who uses it, who controls it, who maintains it, and whether it becomes a military target under conflict scenarios.

j. Fund youth, Guardians, Rangers, and land-based learning as sovereignty infrastructure

The Ottawa workshop repeatedly connected youth to sovereignty. Youth engagement was not framed as symbolic inclusion. It was framed as capacity-building, community security, land protection, national belonging, and intergenerational continuity.

The Canadian Rangers were discussed as one model of persistent presence, but participants warned against romanticizing them without adequate training and resources. Guardians programs were repeatedly identified as successful examples of land-based employment, ecological stewardship, and youth engagement. Participants also proposed a youth corps or climate resilience corps that could bring together Indigenous and non-Indigenous youth, support northern travel and exchange, and build familiarity with the land and with each other.

Such a program would address several problems at once: southern ignorance of the North, youth outmigration, limited local employment pathways, climate adaptation capacity, emergency preparedness, and the relationship gap between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Canadians. It would also operationalize the idea that sovereignty is lived through people, not only asserted through infrastructure.

The policy implication is that the Department of Defence, Environment And Climate Change Canada, Crown-Indigenous Relations and Northern Affairs Canada, territorial governments, Indigenous governments, and research funders should jointly support an Arctic Youth Sovereignty and Climate Resilience Corps connected to Rangers, Guardians, colleges, land-based camps, emergency preparedness, language learning, and community-led research.

k. Ground policy in solidarity, humility, and northern venues

The closed dialogue was frank about the difficulty of Indigenous participation in southern policy events. Northern leaders and Elders face heavy responsibilities, travel burdens, cost barriers, illness, and repeated demands from southern institutions. The absence of a key Indigenous participant due to illness was not simply a logistical problem. It reflected a broader structural issue: policy processes often ask northerners to come south, perform expertise, and validate agendas.

Participants suggested that future work should more often go north, join existing gatherings, and work through established Indigenous and northern institutions. This does not mean southern workshops have no value. It means they should not be the default mode for Indigenous-led policy: "Southerners to the North, not Northerners to the South."

Joan Kuyek's intervention added that many Inuit and Indigenous organizations have already produced strong statements and proposals. CRRIC and similar institutions should avoid reinventing or appropriating those agendas. The role may be to support, amplify, translate, resource, and build bridges rather than to claim ownership.

The policy implication is that the next phase of ICASUS should be co-led with an Indigenous or northern institution and should include field-based engagement in the North. This will require more funding, but the workshop repeatedly made clear that relationship-building cannot be done cheaply or remotely.

I. Use values as an implementation test, not only a conclusion

The final discussion returned to values: the Seven Sacred Teachings, seven-generations thinking, humility, respect, truth, fairness, ecological responsibility, and planetary thinking. These values were not used as ornamental language. They were proposed as tests of whether Arctic policy is being designed for the next election cycle, the next defence announcement, or the next seven generations.

Values help expose contradictions. A project that strengthens deterrence but leaves environmental damage may fail an intergenerational test. A project that creates strategic access but bypasses Indigenous authority may fail a self-determination test. A project that claims dual-use status but brings no meaningful community benefit may fail a reciprocity test. A project that uses emergency language to avoid consultation may fail a legal and relational test.

The policy implication is to create an Arctic Values and Legacy Screen. This would assess whether major projects protect land and water, respect Indigenous authority, strengthen local capacity, reduce long-term vulnerability, preserve future options, and maintain accountability after construction.

6. Day 1 Evidence: Presentations and Panels as Policy Inputs

Day 1 functioned as the research and expert-input component of the PARIS model. It brought together conceptual, comparative, strategic, governmental, climate-science, and civil society perspectives. The value of this day was not only that it supplied content for the report, but that it established the evidentiary base that the closed dialogue could test on Day 2.

The opening sequence located the workshop in Ottawa, on unceded Algonquin Anishinaabe territory, and framed the seminar as a continuation of the Winnipeg foundation. The core proposition was that the Arctic is not empty strategic space, but homeland, memory, governance, and responsibility. This statement shaped the rest of the workshop because it prevented sovereignty from being reduced to the state-centered language of patrol, control, or military presence alone. It also placed the opening remarks within a self-critical frame: the project itself acknowledged that expanding sovereignty to include housing, food, culture, climate, and defence may stretch

the concept, and that bringing Indigenous knowledge into a defence frame risks instrumentalizing it if not handled carefully.

The Yukon Grand Chief Math'ieya Alatini's presentation gave the workshop its most authoritative Indigenous-government framing. The Grand Chief emphasized that Yukon First Nations have modern treaties and self-government experience, and that Arctic sovereignty begins with people, stewardship, self-determination, and healthy communities. Her intervention made clear that Indigenous governments should not be treated as community stakeholders within a federal project, but as governing authorities whose knowledge and jurisdiction shape Canada's capacity to act in the North. This point is central to the policy paper because it transforms Indigenous participation from advisory inclusion into a sovereignty condition.

Dr. Mathieu Landriault's contribution provided an important corrective to public narratives. He identified recurring myths and misperceptions: the idea of a single uniform Arctic, the persistence of climate-science denial, the exaggeration of Arctic resource potential, and the portrayal of the Arctic as a new frontier void of international laws, rules, and regulations. His survey-based comments about public opinion suggest that Arctic policy must be accompanied by public education. If citizens and decision-makers misunderstand the region, they will support slogans that do not fit actual Arctic conditions.

Andrew G. Smith's presentation offered an implementation lesson from the Canadian Institute for Arctic Security. His experience showed that broad definitions of Arctic security may generate buy-in, but operational work requires focus. He distinguished issues where a small institute could make a difference from issues already addressed by larger systems. This matters for CRRIC: the institute's next phase should define its niche carefully, avoiding duplication with northern academia, Indigenous governments, territorial governments, and federal departments. Smith's comments on L6 practitioner knowledge also suggest that future policy work should reach the local actors and officials who understand implementation details, not only senior-level discourse.

Dr. Imtiaz Ahmed's presentation widened the horizon. By foregrounding futures, the Anthropocene, developmentalism, climate dystopia, and geopolitics of cooperation, he challenged the workshop to move beyond reactive threat thinking. His argument that humans create geopolitics, rather than geopolitics creating humans, was a reminder that Arctic futures are not predetermined. The Day 2 recommendation of him on sovereignty mapping should be read in continuity with this futures approach: the future of the Arctic depends partly on whether Canada can imagine governance beyond conventional state-centric categories.

Dr. Paal Sigurd Hilde's presentation on Norway's High North strategies demonstrated how comparative analysis can help without becoming a template. Norway's Arctic is warmer, more populated, more infrastructurally connected, and historically more militarized near Russia than much of northern Canada. Indigenous issues are present in Norway but differently configured. The lesson is not that Canada should become Norway. The lesson is that Arctic policy must account for sub-regional variation and that strategy changes as international conditions change.

Eric Bertram's presentation brought the foreign interference and China dimension into practical policy terms. His description of the Centre for China Policy was significant because it identified a capacity problem: many Arctic and Indigenous partners do not have the staff or resources to follow China-related risks, opportunities, laws, and practices. The federal offer to help be a "China team" for partners should be understood as a policy model: specialized expertise must be made accessible to northern and Indigenous governments rather than concentrated in Ottawa.

Dr. Piché's presentation linked Arctic vulnerabilities to hybrid threats. She connected physical environment, infrastructure gaps, social disparities, colonial grievances, food and water insecurity, telecommunications, and critical infrastructure redundancy to the possibility that adversaries may exploit weakness. This analysis is important because it shows that human-security vulnerabilities are not only ethical concerns; they are strategic vulnerabilities.

The climate panel deepened the material basis of sovereignty. Permafrost thaw was not treated as a scientific abstraction. It was connected to housing foundations, roads, airports, imported food, country food, medicinal plants, cultural sites, burial grounds, and landscape identity. This is one of the strongest reasons the report argues that climate adaptation must be built into defence readiness and infrastructure planning from the start.

7. Day 2 Evidence: Closed Dialogue as Policy Validation

Day 2 functioned differently from Day 1. It was not designed as another presentation day. It was a deep-dive policy dialogue built around leading questions. The discussion began by returning to the Defence Industrial Strategy, forward operating bases, infrastructure maps, and the concern that major decisions may proceed with limited Indigenous participation. This immediately placed consultation, authority, and implementation at the centre of the dialogue.

The first cluster of discussion focused on consultation and national interest. Participants asked whether there had been meaningful consultation built into the current investment model, and whether national security language could override Indigenous title, legal protections, social and environmental assessment, and community consent. The strongest formulation came from Joan Kuyek, who argued that sovereignty means the right to say no. This statement should not be treated as rhetorical excess. It identifies a central legal and political test: if Indigenous sovereignty does not include refusal, then it risks becoming a form of managed participation where colonial practices are maintained.

The second cluster focused on sustainable development and rights-based pragmatism. Dr. Emdad Haque argued that anti-development rhetoric alone would not be enough, but neither would conventional extractive development. He proposed a sustainable development framework grounded in Indigenous ancestral rights, rigorous social and environmental impact assessment, and mandatory space for Indigenous voices. This intervention is useful because it offers a middle path between rejection and accommodation: development may proceed, but only if rights, assessment, and partnership are built into the project structure.

The third cluster focused on conceptual mapping. Dr. Imtiaz Ahmed's intervention moved the discussion from project-by-project consultation to the deeper issue of conceptual translation. If sovereignty, state, culture, peace, war, threat, and colonialism mean different things across communities and policy systems, then Canada needs a research process capable of mapping those differences. This recommendation became one of the clearest future research tasks for CRRIC.

The fourth cluster focused on how to involve and empower Indigenous communities without reproducing extractive participation. Participants acknowledged the difficulty of bringing Indigenous leaders and Elders into southern policy rooms. The costs of travel, overburdened leadership, health issues, community responsibilities, and repeated requests from southern institutions all create barriers. The dialogue therefore recommended that future work move northward, connect with existing Indigenous and youth gatherings, and be based on long-term relationships rather than episodic invitations.

The fifth cluster focused on China and foreign engagement. The dialogue did not settle on a single view of China. Some participants emphasized infrastructure vulnerability and the risk of external influence. Others argued that China should not be reduced to an enemy narrative and may have a different civilizational, trade, and investment logic. The policy conclusion is not to choose between fear and openness. It is to build capacity, guardrails, and informed decision-making so northern and Indigenous partners can protect their interests.

The sixth cluster focused on youth and intergenerational work. Participants proposed youth leadership, land-based training, a youth corps, Guardians, and exchanges between northern and southern communities. This was not a peripheral recommendation. It was a practical answer to the long-term problem of national disconnection: many Canadians know little about the North, and many northern youth leave because opportunities are limited.

The seventh cluster focused on values. The closing reflections referred to the Seven Sacred Teachings, the seven-generations principle, humility, ecological security, and planetary thinking. These values should not be relegated to the conclusion. They should become evaluation criteria for major investments. Projects should be judged by whether they strengthen relationships, protect land and water, build future capacity, and leave a better North for future generations.

8. Proposed Design for a Sovereignty Mapping Project

The sovereignty mapping recommendation is important enough to merit its own project design. A future CRRIC initiative could be titled Mapping Arctic Sovereignty: Indigenous Concepts, State Frameworks, and Policy Translation. It should be designed as a co-led research project with an Indigenous or northern institutional partner. Instead of producing one universal Indigenous definition of sovereignty, the purpose would be to map plurality, identify policy consequences, and create a translation tool for decision-makers.

The project could begin with a literature review of existing Indigenous declarations, Inuit policy statements, modern treaty texts, self-government agreements, Guardians program materials, court decisions, academic literature, and federal Arctic policy language. This would prevent duplication and respect the work already done by Indigenous organizations.

The second stage would involve community-defined interviews or talking circles with selected Indigenous governments, Elders, youth, knowledge holders, and policy practitioners. The selection should be limited and realistic in the first phase. It may focus on two or three regions rather than attempting to cover all of the circumpolar North at once.

The third stage would compare Indigenous and state uses of key concepts: sovereignty, state, nation, land, water, ice, mobility, security, defence, threat, peace, war, development, consultation, consent, stewardship, infrastructure, and national interest. The project should pay attention to language and translation, including whether English policy terms distort Indigenous concepts.

The fourth stage would convert the mapping into practical guidance. For example, if a community defines sovereignty through mobility and food systems, then a road, runway, mine, radar site, or port must be assessed for its effect on travel routes, caribou migration, hunting, ice safety, and access to country food. If sovereignty is defined through the right to say no, then consultation cannot be reduced to mitigation. If sovereignty is defined through intergenerational responsibility, then life-cycle and legacy obligations become central.

The final outputs could include a policy report, a concept dictionary, a briefing note for DND and Global Affairs, a community-facing summary, and a methodological guide for future PARIS seminars. This would be a concrete and distinctive contribution by CRRIC.

9. Policy Risks if Workshop #2 Findings are Ignored

Risk	Description	Likely consequence	Mitigation
Consultation risk	Projects proceed with procedural engagement after core decisions are made.	Litigation, mistrust, delays, reputational harm, weak legitimacy.	Adopt front-end co-decision protocols and technical support for Indigenous governments.
Legacy risk	Infrastructure is built for immediate defence or extraction needs without long-term local benefit.	Abandoned assets, contamination, social disruption, maintenance burdens.	Require Northern Legacy Plans with cleanup, reuse, and local procurement obligations.

Climate risk	Permafrost, sea ice, wildfire, and water changes are underbuilt into project design.	Infrastructure failure, resupply disruption, higher maintenance costs, unsafe travel.	Make climate adaptation a design requirement for all Arctic investments.
Conceptual risk	Sovereignty is used as a consensus word while actors mean different things.	Policy confusion, symbolic inclusion, failure to recognize Indigenous authority.	Conduct sovereignty mapping and develop a policy translation guide.
Foreign engagement risk	Northern and Indigenous partners face sophisticated external actors without sufficient support.	Coercive influence, data vulnerability, problematic investment, dependency.	Create an Arctic Foreign Engagement Support Mechanism.
Human-security risk	Housing, health, food, education, fentanyl, and social distress are treated as separate from security.	Communities remain vulnerable; adversaries exploit gaps; legitimacy declines.	Use a layered Arctic security framework.
Youth capacity risk	Young people remain excluded from sovereignty and climate adaptation pathways.	Outmigration, limited local capacity, weak intergenerational continuity.	Fund youth corps, Guardians, Rangers, and land-based learning.

10. Presenter-Specific Contributions

Contributor	Key contribution	Policy use
Yukon Grand Chief Math'ieya Alatini	Defined Arctic sovereignty through Indigenous government, modern treaties, stewardship, healthy communities, food systems, and future generations.	Use as the anchor for Indigenous-government authority and the community wellbeing-security link.
Dr. Kawser Ahmed	Framed Workshop #2 through PARIS, Krasner's sovereignty typology, lived capacity, Defence Industrial Strategy, U.S.-Canada rupture, and the need to map sovereignty.	Use as the conceptual and methodological bridge between Workshop #1 and Workshop #2.
David Newman	Opened with land acknowledgement, settler responsibility, co-design, and later emphasized global human and ecological security.	Use for values, solidarity, and planetary security framing.
Dr. Mathieu Landriault	Identified persistent Arctic myths: one uniform Arctic, climate change denial, exaggerated resource bonanza, and the 'new far west' narrative.	Use to support sub-regional analysis and public narrative correction.
Andrew G. Smith	Discussed the Canadian Institute for Arctic Security, fit-for-purpose definitions, L6 practitioner knowledge, gray-zone threats, dual-use ambiguity, and northern security communication.	Use for analytic discipline and implementation realism.
Dr. Imtiaz Ahmed	Proposed climate futures, geopolitics of cooperation, reimagining development/water/ocean/geopolitics, and sovereignty concept mapping.	Use to structure the future research agenda and sovereignty mapping recommendation.
Dr. Paal Sigurd Hilde	Explained Norway's High North strategies and emphasized the major differences between the European and Canadian Arctic.	Use for comparative caution and lessons without template copying.
Marisol Maddox	In Q&A, discussed U.S.-Canada trade/defence links, continental defence, Golden Dome, sovereignty respect, and a positive cooperation vision amid 51st-state rhetoric.	Use for a nuanced Canada-U.S. section.
Eric Bertram	Explained Canada's need to build China knowledge, partner with Arctic governments, protect against foreign interference, and use guardrails while maintaining engagement.	Use for foreign engagement capacity and China guardrails.
Dr. Piché	Connected climate, infrastructure, hybrid threats, Arctic investments, critical minerals, foreign influence, and resilience.	Use for threat-vulnerability analysis and infrastructure investment.
Dr. Ken Coates	Challenged rhetoric versus delivery; argued that fentanyl, housing, poverty, education, and teacher turnover are security issues; praised Guardians and land-based programs.	Use to ensure human-security specificity.

Natalija Vojno	Emphasized environmental peacebuilding, relationality, source-water protection, early engagement, youth corps, and human security as national security.	Use for co-design mechanisms and youth/relationship recommendations.
Dr. Fabrice Calmels, Dr. Emdad Haque and Dr. Alex Crawford	Connected permafrost thaw to housing, roads, airports, food security, cultural sites, country food, and landscape change.	Use to link climate adaptation to infrastructure design and cultural continuity.
Joan Kuyek	Argued that sovereignty includes the right to say no, warned about national-interest overrides, extractive capitalism, mining legacies, and solidarity with existing Indigenous agendas.	Use for consent, rights, and sustainable development safeguards.

11. Recommendations

a. Establish a sovereignty mapping initiative

CRRIC, in partnership with Indigenous and northern institutions, should map meanings of sovereignty, state, security, peace, war, threat, consent, development, and colonialism across Indigenous and northern communities. The output should include a policy translation guide for DND, Global Affairs, Crown-Indigenous Relations, territorial and provincial governments, and Indigenous governments.

b. Create an Arctic Co-Decision Protocol

Major defence, infrastructure, energy, port, road, radar, and critical-mineral projects should use a front-end co-decision protocol. This should include shared problem definition, Indigenous-government and leadership participation in site selection, independent technical resources, social and environmental assessment, risk-reward transparency, gender and youth input, and a right to propose alternatives.

c. Adopt a layered Arctic security framework

Federal policy should distinguish but connect hard defence, public safety, human security, ecological security, infrastructure security, and Indigenous self-determination. This will prevent both narrow militarization and unhelpful conceptual dilution.

d. Require a Northern Legacy Plan for major investments

Every major Arctic project should include a life-cycle plan for local benefit, Indigenous procurement, cleanup, take-back obligations, maintenance, community reuse, environmental monitoring, and long-term funding.

e. Treat climate adaptation as a condition of defence readiness

All defence and infrastructure projects should integrate permafrost risk, sea-ice uncertainty, wildfire, water levels, community resupply, Indigenous land knowledge, and climate adaptation costs from the design stage.

f. Build Arctic foreign engagement guardrails

Canada should fund a support mechanism that gives Indigenous and northern governments access to expertise on China, cyber risk, data governance, investment screening, research security, and transnational repression, while preserving transparent and beneficial cooperation.

g. Fund an Arctic Youth Sovereignty and Climate Resilience Corps

A cross-government and Indigenous-led program should support Guardians, Rangers, youth exchanges, land-based training, emergency preparedness, language learning, climate monitoring, and northern leadership.

h. Move future ICASUS work northward

Future workshops and research should be co-led with Indigenous or northern institutions and, wherever possible, conducted in northern venues or attached to existing northern gatherings.

i. Use a values and seven-generations screen

Arctic policy decisions should be tested for intergenerational impact, ecological harm, Indigenous authority, local benefit, reversibility, and consistency with reconciliation commitments.

j. Strengthen civilian emergency capacity

The Canadian Armed Forces should not become the default responder for every northern crisis. Canada should build regional civilian emergency systems, local training, communications redundancy, evacuation planning, and community-led preparedness.

k. Clarify dual-use infrastructure

Canada should define dual-use infrastructure formally and transparently, including civilian benefit, military function, ownership, maintenance, conflict risk, and community authority.

l. Coordinate with allies without surrendering policy autonomy

Canada should maintain NORAD and allied cooperation while defining a Canadian Arctic policy grounded in Indigenous leadership, strategic autonomy, community resilience, and climate adaptation.

12. Implementation Pathway for CRRIC and Partners

The Ottawa workshop asked repeatedly what CRRIC can do next. The answer is not that CRRIC should replace northern or Indigenous institutions. Rather, CRRIC can contribute by convening across sectors, translating multi-disciplinary evidence into policy language, supporting research design, and developing partnerships that allow Indigenous and northern institutions to lead or co-lead future work.

The first pathway is a Sovereignty Mapping Project. This should be scoped as a focused research initiative, not a side activity. It should identify partner communities or institutions, develop ethical protocols, include Indigenous language and concept expertise, and produce outputs in both academic and policy formats. The project should consider whether the concepts of sovereignty, state, security, threat, peace, war, land, water, consent, development, and national interest translate cleanly or require new categories.

The second pathway is an Indigenous-led or co-led field workshop in the North. The Ottawa discussion made clear that southern venues are limited. Future ICASUS engagement should attach itself to existing northern gatherings where possible, or fund community-hosted events that compensate participants, support travel within the North, and avoid overburdening Elders and leaders.

The third pathway is a practical policy lab on co-decision. CRRIC can work with legal scholars, Indigenous governments, DND, territorial representatives, and civil society to design a prototype Arctic Co-Decision Protocol. The protocol could be tested against one case: a radar site, an airport upgrade, a road/port project, a climate relocation scenario, a communications project, or a critical minerals proposal.

The fourth pathway is a youth and capacity initiative. CRRIC can explore partnerships with Guardians programs, Canadian Rangers networks, northern universities and/or colleges, northern youth leadership organizations, environmental funders, and federal departments to develop a youth corps or exchange model. The goal would be to connect sovereignty, climate adaptation, land-based knowledge, emergency preparedness, and inter-cultural learning.

The fifth pathway is a foreign engagement support network. CRRIC does not need to become a China security institute. It can, however, convene expertise from Global Affairs, cyber-security specialists, Indigenous governments, northern development corporations, and legal experts to help communities ask better questions about foreign investment, research partnerships, data access, and technology proposals.

13. Conclusion

Workshop #2 confirms that ICASUS has moved from a conceptual conversation to an implementation challenge. The March workshop established the need to understand Arctic sovereignty as lived capacity. The Ottawa workshop asked what this means when Canada is preparing new defence and infrastructure investments under geopolitical pressure, when climate change is reshaping the physical North, when foreign actors see opportunity in infrastructure gaps, and when Indigenous governments continue to insist that they are not stakeholders but authoritative governments.

The strongest message is that sovereignty must be built with people who live the North, not merely asserted over the space they inhabit. That requires mapping sovereignty, sharing authority, funding capacity, supporting youth, protecting land and water, and treating climate adaptation as central to defence readiness. It also requires humility from research institutions. Indigenous organizations have already spoken, proposed, governed, resisted, and protected. The role of CRRIC and similar institutions is to support, convene, translate, and help create policy conditions in which those voices shape decisions before they are made.

Canada is at crossroads. One path uses national security urgency to justify rapid construction, compressed consultation, and externally driven development. The other path uses the same moment of urgency to build a stronger country: one that understands human security as national security, ecological responsibility as strategic responsibility, and Indigenous self-determination as a foundation of Arctic sovereignty. The Ottawa workshop clearly points toward the second path.

Annex A: Consolidated Quote Bank

Theme	Quote	Source
Sovereignty	The Arctic is not empty strategic space. It is homeland, memory, governance, and responsibility.	Opening remarks, June 19
Sovereignty	Arctic sovereignty is not simply control of space; it is care of place.	Opening remarks, June 19
Effective capacity	A line on a map is not the same as the power to act upon it.	Opening remarks, June 19
Indigenous government	Yukon First Nations are not stakeholders, we are governments.	Yukon Grand Chief Math'ieya Alatini, June 19
Community security	You cannot separate national security from community well-being.	Yukon Grand Chief, June 19
Consent	Sovereignty means the right to say no.	Joan Kuyek, June 20
Human security	Human security is national security.	Natalija Vojno, June 20
Sovereignty mapping	I think CRRIC can do research on mapping the meaning of all these - state, sovereignty, culture - because they're all different.	Dr. Imtiaz Ahmed, June 20
Climate and access	A climate-changed Arctic is not necessarily an easier to access Arctic.	Andrew G. Smith, June 19
China capacity	Our offer is: we can help be your China team.	Eric Bertram, June 19
Future work	Southerners to the North, not Northerners to the South.	Policy discussion summary, June 20
Policy honesty	Good policy needs evidence; good security needs trust; good infrastructure needs community legitimacy; and good sovereignty needs people.	Opening remarks, June 19
Plural Arctics	The Arctic is plural; it is many sub-regions, not just one uniform region.	Paraphrased from Dr. Mathieu Landriault, June 19
Co-creation	Dialogue, access, risk-reward transparency, and reflexivity.	Darcia Senft, June 20, summarizing Stanford co-creation model
Values	We should adopt the Seven Sacred Teachings of the values.	Joan Kuyek, June 20 closing
Community	Build the community as more national security.	Gary Senft, June 20 closing

Annex B: Relationship Between Policy Report #1 and Policy Report #2

Area	Policy Report #1 baseline	Policy Report #2 contribution
Sovereignty	Lived capacity and self-determination	Sovereignty concept mapping across communities and governance systems
Consultation	Consultation must become co-design	Co-decision, co-implementation, legal duty, UNDRIP, litigation risk, process design
Climate	Climate change as total systems condition	Climate adaptation as defence readiness, permafrost risk, unpredictable access, life-cycle design
Security	Broader than war; strategy-delivery gap	Layered security framework and analytic discipline
Infrastructure	Material foundation of sovereignty	Legacy infrastructure, local benefit, procurement, remediation, dual-use definition
Indigenous knowledge	Operational knowledge	Government-to-government authority and knowledge as decision power
International	Pragmatic cooperation	U.S. rupture, China guardrails, comparative Norway/Greenland lessons
Youth	Training and local capacity-building	Youth corps, Guardians, Rangers, exchanges, land-based sovereignty infrastructure